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NOTES
Straying from the Written Path: How the Supreme Court
Eviscerated the Plain Meaning of the MVRA’s Ninety-Day
Deadline Provision and Legislated from the Bench in Dolan
v. United States
I. Introduction
A statutory interpretation scholar once quipped, “Federal statutes do not
come with instructions, but maybe they should.”1 Such a remark reflects the
confused feeling that many members of the legal profession experience when
trying to understand the Supreme Court’s method of statutory interpretation.2
Although members of courts employ various methods to interpret statutes,
techniques can generally be broken down into two approaches: textualist and
traditional.3 The textualist approach focuses “on the ‘plain meaning’ of the
language of the statute.”4 The traditional approach considers contextual
evidence such as legislative history in addition to a statute’s text, regardless
of the presence of any “plain meaning.”5 The issue of statutory interpretation
may be contentious at the best of times, but this tension is magnified when
interpreting the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act (MVRA)—a statute that
represents one of the most aggressive legislative moves to ensure victims’
rights in criminal law.
Passage of the MVRA in 1996 was the legislative pinnacle of the Victims’
Rights Movement, which arose from victims’ frustration over their lack of
participation in the criminal justice system, especially as it pertained to
offenders.6 The passage of the MVRA signaled a change in the direction of
criminal law at the federal level: restitution would no longer be a form of
punishment, but would rather be a means for providing compensation to
1. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866 (2008) (noting that “the Court’s practice
of treating doctrines of statutory interpretation differently than other legal doctrines with
respect to stare decisis is deeply puzzling”).
3. See Rebecca L. Spiro, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Rehnquist Court:
Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000).
4. Id. at 105.
5. Id. at 106.
6. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985
UTAH L. REV. 517, 525-26.
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victims of certain crimes.7 At the heart of the MVRA was the mandatory
requirement that courts order defendants to pay restitution to their victims for
certain crimes.8 By 2010, several of the United States Courts of Appeals had
come to a split in opinion concerning the implications of missing the
restitution deadline provision in the MVRA.9 The Supreme Court confronted
this split in Dolan v. United States.10
In Dolan, the Court addressed the issue of whether a trial court is stripped
of its authority to order restitution if it misses the MVRA deadline for doing
so.11 The Court classified the restitution deadline provision of the MVRA as
a speed-seeking deadline and discussed the purpose of the MVRA and its
legislative history, before concluding that missing the deadline does not
deprive a court of its authority to enter an order of restitution.12
This note argues that the decision reached by the majority in Dolan was
incorrect. The Court erred by ignoring the plain meaning of the language in
the MVRA, which ultimately led the Court to violate the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. Part II of this note provides a brief
overview of the MVRA and its predecessor, the Victims and Witness
Protection Act, as well as a quick overview of the social movement that led to
their passage. Part III provides three examples of cases in which the
Supreme Court has previously determined the penalty for missing statutory
deadlines. Part IV discusses Dolan and the Court’s rationale for its decision.
Part V argues that the majority in Dolan erred by ignoring the plain meaning
of the language of the MVRA and allowing the legislative intent behind the
MVRA to guide the Court’s reasoning. Additionally, Part V argues that after
straying from the clear text of the MVRA that requires a court to order
restitution within ninety days of sentencing, the majority erred by refusing to
utilize the rule of lenity to clarify any ambiguity that may have existed in the
MVRA. In so doing, the Court violated the bedrock constitutional principle
7. Beth Bates Holliday, Annotation, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. FED. 2d
283, 283 (2008).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2000).
9. Compare United States v. Balentine, 569 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding
authority for the court to enter restitution past the ninety-day statutory deadline), and United
States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (same), with United States v. Farr, 419 F.3d
621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no authority for the court to enter restitution past the
ninety-day deadline), and United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2001)
(same).
10. 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 2539.
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of separation of powers by legislating from the bench. Finally, Part V argues
that the Court made an error by relying too heavily on Montalvo-Murillo as a
parallel case, implicitly analogizing the common law goal of punishing an
offender to the MVRA’s legislative goal of promoting restitution. Part VI
concludes this note.
II. Overview of the MVRA and the Events Leading up to Its Passage
A. The Victims’ Rights Movement
The exact point when the Victims’ Rights Movement (VRM) began is not
known.13 During the 1960s and 1970s, however, when Chief Justice Earl
Warren and the Supreme Court began issuing opinions that expanded rights
for the criminally accused, crime victims and their advocates began rallying
for the rights of victims in the system.14 Today, the VRM has grown into “a
legislative movement to codify the ‘rights’ of crime victims.”15 The VRM is
identified with a sense of frustration over the lack of participation victims
have in the criminal justice system with respect to the alleged or convicted
offender.16 The VRM’s appeal cuts across a wide spectrum of advocates,
with supporters of victims’ rights coming from a variety of political and
economic backgrounds.17
Between 1973 and 1983, the VRM’s success was readily apparent in the
increased number of organizations and agencies dedicated to victims’
rights.18 In 1982, President Reagan commissioned the Task Force on Victims
of Crime, which held “public hearings throughout the country, thereby
focusing national attention on the problems crime victims suffer.”19 The
Task Force found:
[S]omewhere along the way, the system has lost track of the
simple truth that it is supposed to be fair and protect those who
obey the law while punishing those who break it. Somewhere

13. LEIGH GLENN, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS xiii (1997).
14. Id.
15. Sara Manaugh, The Vengeful Logic of Modern Criminal Restitution, 1 LAW,
CULTURE & HUMAN. 359, 368 (2005).
16. Id. at 370.
17. See Abrahamson, supra note 6, at 525-26; see also Edna Erez & Julian Roberts,
Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 277, 279 (Robert
C. Davis, Arthur J. Lurigio & Susan Herman eds., 3d ed. 2007).
18. Abrahamson, supra note 6, at 528-29.
19. GLENN, supra note 13, at 63.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

214

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:211

along the way, the system began to serve lawyers and judges and
defendants, treating the victim with institutionalized disinterest.20
With decades of momentum on its side, the VRM achieved what was
perceived as a significant victory with the passage of the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982.
B. The Victim and Witness Protection Act (1982)
In 1982, just as the “plight of the victim, the ‘forgotten person,’” entered
the “forefront of the public’s consciousness,”21 Congress enacted the Victim
and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) in an attempt “to address the unmet
needs of crime victims.”22 Specifically, Congress expressed intent to
“strengthen existing legal protections for victims and witnesses of Federal
crimes.”23
The VWPA was a significant step in changing the landscape of criminal
punishment. Congress recognized that restitution had played an integral role
in the criminal justice system of every culture at every point in time.24 The
principle of restitution, according to Congress, holds that “whatever else the
sanctioning power of society does to punish wrongdoers, it should also insure
that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to
his or her prior state of well-being.”25
Prior to the VWPA, restitution in criminal law was only “an optional
condition of probation.”26 Under the VWPA, however, federal courts were
authorized to require restitution independent of probation.27 The VWPA did
not require a court to order restitution. Thus, the power to order restitution
was discretionary. However, the VWPA did require that when a court

20. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME vi (1982), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presd
ntstskforcrprt/welcome.html.
21. Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora’s Box – The
Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 507, 507 (1984).
22. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 77
JUDICATURE 90, 90 (1993).
23. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 9 (1982).
24. See id. at 30. But see 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 1 (2001)
(omitting any reference to punishment in discussion of historical definition and nature of
restitution).
25. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30.
26. Tobolowsky, supra note 22, at 91.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1985).
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declines to order restitution, the court must state the reasons for not doing so
on the record,28 which applied pressure to courts to order restitution.
In addition to having discretion in determining whether restitution will be
ordered, the judge also had discretion in the amount ordered. The VWPA
required judges to consider “the amount of the victim’s loss from the offense,
the defendant’s financial resources, and the financial needs and earning
ability of the defendant and his or her dependants.”29 Thus, restitution under
the VWPA was not really victim-centered as much as it was contingent upon
the defendant’s circumstances and ability to pay.30
C. The Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act (1996)
Addressing concerns that the VWPA left too much discretion to judges in
awarding restitution, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution
Act (MVRA) in 1996 to “reflect a fundamental shift in the purpose of
restitution from a means of punishment and rehabilitation to an attempt to
provide those who suffer the consequences of crime with some means of
recouping their personal and financial losses.”31 Congress noted that “[i]t is
essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that crime has
on the victim, and, to the extent possible, to ensure that [the] offender be held
accountable to repay those costs.”32
Specifically, the MVRA expands the VWPA in two ways. First, whereas
restitution was discretionary under the VWPA, federal courts are obligated to
order restitution under the MVRA.33 Second, the MVRA provides that “[i]n
each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the
full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without
consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.”34 Thus,
while the VWPA allowed a judge to take the defendant’s financial
circumstances into consideration when deciding the amount of restitution,
such consideration is not permitted under the MVRA. The defendant is
required to make full restitution to the victim.

28. Id. § 3579.
29. Id. § 3580(a).
30. See Mathew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2009).
31. Holliday, supra note 7, at 283.
32. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 930.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2000).
34. Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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In order to ensure that victims receive full restitution, the MVRA included
a provision that extends the time period during which the court may obtain
pertinent information concerning the amount of restitution needed:
If the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10
days prior to sentencing, the attorney for the government or the
probation officer shall so inform the court, and the court shall set a
date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to
exceed 90 days after sentencing.35
Furthermore, Congress included a safe harbor provision for the discovery
of new losses relating to restitution in order to ensure that victims were fully
compensated:
If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall
have 60 days after discovery of those losses in which to petition
the court for an amended restitution order. Such order may be
granted only upon a showing of good cause for the failure to
include such losses in the initial claim for restitutionary relief.36
Thus, although there is a deadline for ordering restitution, the MVRA’s
safe harbor provision ensures that insufficiencies in the amount of restitution
ordered could be rectified after the ninety-day deadline expires.
III. The Supreme Court’s Categorical Approach to Missed
Deadline Sanctions
Prior to Dolan, the Supreme Court had already decided several cases
relating to penalties for missed statutory deadlines.37 The Court’s analysis in
Dolan began by determining whether the MVRA deadline is a speed-seeking,
claims-processing, or jurisdictional deadline.38 The following discussion
provides an overview of the three deadline cases that the Supreme Court cited
in its decision in Dolan.

35. Id. § 3664(d)(5).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (ruling that missed
jurisdictional deadlines strip a court of its authority to act pursuant to the relative provision);
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (ruling that claims-processing deadlines
provide relief to parties properly raising the lapsed deadline as a defense before a trial court
has reached the merits); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990)
(ruling that missing a “speed seeking” deadline does not strip a court of authority to act).
38. See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2538 (2010).
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A. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo: Speed-Seeking Deadlines
In United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, the Court contemplated the
appropriate remedy for a violation of a hearing deadline set by the Bail
Reform Act of 1984.39 The Act provides that:
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any
condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure
the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community . . . . The hearing shall be held
immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial
officer unless that person, or the attorney for the government,
seeks a continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on
motion of the person may not exceed five days, and a continuance
on motion of the attorney for the Government may not exceed
three days. During a continuance, such person shall be
detained . . . . The person may be detained pending completion of
the hearing.40
United States Customs Agents found approximately 72 pounds of cocaine
hidden in Montalvo-Murillo’s truck at a New Mexico checkpoint near the
international border on February 8, 1989.41 Montalvo-Murillo agreed to
cooperate with Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) authorities and make a
controlled delivery of the cocaine to purchasers in Chicago.42 The transaction
was not completed, however, because the purchasers failed to arrive at the
drop point in Chicago.43
On Friday, February 10, a transfer hearing for Montalvo-Murillo was held
before a Magistrate in the Northern District of Illinois to arrange for the
transfer of Montalvo-Murillo back to New Mexico where charges had been
filed against him.44 Montalvo-Murillo was returned to New Mexico that
evening.45
On Monday, February 13, the Magistrate’s office in New Mexico
scheduled a detention hearing for Thursday, February 16, which the court,
sua sponte, ordered to be continued until the next Monday due to a lack of a

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See 495 U.S. at 713.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2000).
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 714-15.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prepared report by the Pretrial Services Office.46 Because that Monday fell
on a holiday, the hearing was actually set for Tuesday, February 21.47 At the
hearing, the Magistrate ordered the release of Montalvo-Murillo with $50,000
bond and other conditions because he was not deemed to be a flight risk or a
danger to the community or persons therein.48
The District Court of New Mexico decided on review that, although
nothing assured Montalvo-Murillo’s appearance or the community’s safety,
Montalvo-Murillo should be released.49 The court ruled that “the detention
hearing had not been held upon respondent’s first appearance as specified by
section 3142(f), and that pretrial release on conditions was the appropriate
remedy for violation of the statutory requirement.”50 The Tenth Circuit
agreed and affirmed the district court’s ruling.51
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that “a failure to
comply with the first appearance requirement does not defeat the
Government’s authority to seek detention of the person charged.”52
According to the Court, “[T]here is no presumption or general rule that for
every duty imposed upon the court or the government and its prosecutors
there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omission,
even if negligent.”53
Thus, for one type of deadline—speed-seeking deadlines—the Supreme
Court ruled that missing the statutory deadline, regardless of the mandatory
language used, did not strip a court of any authority to act upon the provision
to which the deadline relates.54
B. Eberhart v. United States: Claims-Processing Deadlines
In Eberhart v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the remedy for
missing the deadline for filing a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule
33(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.55 Rule 33(b)(2)
provides that “any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 715-16.
49. Id. at 716
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 717.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 721 (stating “[w]e do not agree that we should, or can, invent a remedy to
satisfy some perceived need to coerce the courts and the government into complying with
the statutory time limits”).
55. See 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam).
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newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or
finding of guilty, or within such further time as the court sets during the 7day period.”56
Eberhart was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.57 On the final
day for post-trial motions, Eberhart “moved for judgment of acquittal or, in
the alternative, for a new trial,” raising as his sole argument that there was a
“flaw in the transcript that had been published to the jury.”58 About six
months later, he filed an addendum to support his motion, which listed two
additional grounds for relief—“[A]dmission of potential hearsay testimony
into evidence, and the District Court’s failure to give a so-called ‘buyer-seller
instruction’ to the jury.”59 The government did not oppose the motion
because of its untimeliness, but rather objected on its merits.60
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois awarded Eberhart a
new trial, concluding that although none of the three grounds alone, nor any
two as a pair, would warrant a new trial, the three arguments taken together
warranted a new trial in the interest of justice.61 The government appealed
the ruling, focusing on the untimeliness of Eberhart’s supplemental
addendum and arguing that the district court abused its discretion in granting
a new trial.62 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial because the deadline in
Rule 33 is a jurisdictional deadline which strips a court of jurisdiction to act
once that deadline has lapsed.63 According to the Seventh Circuit, even
amendments to timely filed actions are outside the court’s jurisdiction to
entertain.64
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit,65 holding that Rule 33
was not a jurisdictional deadline, but rather a claims-processing rule.66
Claims-processing rules differ from jurisdictional rules in that claimsprocessing rules “assure relief to a party properly raising them, but do not
compel the same result if the party forfeits them.”67 Jurisdictional rules, on
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2) (2005) (amended 2009).
Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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the other hand, refer to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling
within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”68
Thus, Eberhart articulated a distinction between jurisdictional deadlines
and claims-processing deadlines,69 ruling that claims-processing deadlines
may be missed without sanction as long as neither party asserts the missed
deadline issue prior to a decision on the merits.70
C. Bowles v. Russell: Jurisdictional Conditions
In Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme Court considered the penalty for
missing a jurisdictional deadline such as filing a notice of appeal.71 At issue
in the case was Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which reads: “The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a
period of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only
if all the following conditions are satisfied . . . .”72
Bowles was convicted of murder in 1999 for his participation in the
beating death of Ollie Gipson and sentenced to imprisonment.73 After an
unsuccessful direct appeal, Bowles filed a habeas corpus application which
was denied on September 9, 2003.74 Following the date of entry of final
judgment, Bowles failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty days, but he
moved to reopen the appeals period for fourteen days pursuant to Rule
4(a)(6).75 On February 10, 2004, the District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio ordered the appeals period to be reopened, but not for the fourteen
days pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6).76 Rather, the court reopened the period for
seventeen days, without explaining any reason for the longer period.77
Bowles filed his notice of appeal within the seventeen days allowed by the
court, but after the fourteen days required by Rule 4(a)(6).78 The Sixth
Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the notice of
Bowles’ appeal failed to meet the deadline requirements of Rule 4(a)(6),

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 16.
See id.
Id. at 19.
See 551 U.S. 205, 206 (2007).
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) (emphasis added).
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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noting that such a deadline “is mandatory and jurisdictional” and “not
susceptible to equitable modification.”79
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit.80 The Court noted that
“the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional.’”81 Within constitutional bounds, the Court said, Congress
holds the power to determine the subject-matter and class of cases that federal
courts may hear.82 According to the Court, “[b]ecause Congress specifically
limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-ofappeal period . . . that limitation is more than a simple ‘claims-processing
rule.’”83
Thus, Bowles suggests that the only type of deadline which strips a court
of authority to extend it sua sponte is a jurisdictional deadline.
IV. United States v. Dolan
A. Statement of the Case
On February 8, 2007, Brian Dolan pled “guilty to a federal charge of
assault resulting in serious bodily injury.”84 The plea agreement stated that
the court could order Dolan to pay restitution to his victim.85 According to
the presentence report, however, restitution was not optional—it was
required.86 In spite of this requirement, the court did not recommend an
amount of restitution because it lacked sufficient information to do so.87
On July 30, 2007, the day of Dolan’s sentencing hearing, the district court
judge “sentenced Dolan to 21 months imprisonment along with 3 years of
supervised release.”88 Even though ordering restitution was mandatory, the
judge delayed doing so but warned Dolan that such a restitution order would
be made in the future.89 On August 8, the court entered a judgment that

79. Id. at 207-08.
80. Id. at 208.
81. Id. at 209 (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)
(per curiam)).
82. Id. at 212-13.
83. Id. at 213.
84. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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stated restitution would not be entered at that time due to a lack of sufficient
information regarding the amount owed.90
On October 5 (twenty-three days before the MVRA’s ninety-day
restitution deadline), the probation office “prepared an addendum to the
presentence report . . . which reflected the views of the parties, and which the
judge later indicated he had received.”91 Within the addendum, the amount
of restitution due in the case totaled approximately $105,000.92
The sentencing court scheduled Dolan’s restitution hearing for February 4,
2008, almost three months after the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline for
ordering restitution had lapsed.93 At the hearing, Dolan argued that the court
could no longer order restitution, pointing out that the ninety-day deadline for
ordering such restitution had already expired.94 The court, however, did not
find the argument convincing and ordered Dolan to pay restitution.95 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.96
Thus, the question before the Supreme Court concerned the remedy for
missing the ninety-day deadline to impose restitution under § 3664(d)(5) of
the MVRA, given that the text of the statute does not explicitly address the
consequences of missing the deadline.
B. The Court’s Decision
The Court began its discussion by noting that the parties did not dispute
whether the ninety-day deadline had lapsed, whether the sentencing court had
sufficient information to impose restitution prior to the deadline, or whether
the court had any reasons for missing the deadline.97 The only question
before the Court was what remedy should be imposed, if any, for missing the
ninety-day deadline.98
The Court determined the answer by looking to the “statutory language, to
the relevant context, and to what they reveal about the purposes that a time
limit is designed to serve.”99 In some cases, according to the Court, the
statutory deadline is a “jurisdictional” deadline—one that acts to cut off, for
instance, “a court’s authority to hear a case, to consider pleadings, or to act
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2538.
Id.
Id.
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upon motions that a party seeks to file.”100 In such instances, allowing the
deadline to expire results in an absolute bar of the court’s authority to
disregard the deadline.101 Such deadlines cannot be waived or extended for
any equitable reasons.102
In other circumstances, the Court stated, a deadline is merely a tool for
regulating the “timing of motions or claims brought before the court.”103
Such deadlines are not a limitation on the court’s jurisdiction and may be
classified as “claims-processing” rules.104 The party who seeks the
deadline’s protection forfeits that protection unless that party notifies the trial
court that the other party missed the deadline.105 For example, if a party
wishes to benefit from the lapsing deadline (e.g., claim that a party lacks the
ability to file for a new trial because they missed the deadline for doing so),
that party must first have pointed out to the trial court, prior to a decision on
the merits, that the deadline was in fact missed.
Finally, the Court noted that in other instances, a deadline “seeks speed by
creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does not
deprive a judge or public official of the power to take the action to which the
deadline applies if the deadline is missed.”106
The Court decided that the ninety-day deadline imposed by the MVRA is a
“speed-seeking” deadline and that when the deadline is missed, the court
retains the power to order restitution pursuant to the MVRA.107 The Court
considered several factors in reaching this decision.
First, according to the Court, when a statute is silent as to the consequence
of failing to comply with a timing provision, “federal courts will not in the
ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.”108 In this context, a
statute’s use of the word “shall” does not automatically bar an authority from
taking action once the deadline has lapsed.109
Second, the Court considered the “primary weight” of the text and noted
that the Act’s importance centers on “imposing restitution upon those
convicted of certain federal crimes.”110 The Court also noted that the MVRA
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990)).
Id. at 2539.
Id. (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 64 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
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amended an older provision that permitted, but did not mandate, restitution
orders, and emphasized that the wording of the statute mandates full
restitution to victims “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”111
Third, the Court found that the procedural provisions included in the Act
reinforce the primary substantive purpose of the statute to assure full
restitution for victims of certain crimes.112 The Court acknowledged that
speed is indeed important, noting that several provisions do provide for
timely fact-gathering to decide the proper restitution amount,113 but decided
that the speed sought is primarily for the benefit of the victims and only
secondarily for the benefit of the defendant.114
The Court also paid close attention to § 3664(d)(5) of the Act, which
reads: “If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall
have 60 days after discovery of the losses in which to petition the court for an
amended restitution order.”115 Because this provision essentially allows a
court to change the restitution amount at any point subsequent to the initial
restitution order, the Court believed that in conjunction with the Act’s
substantive purpose of providing full restitution, the speed sought by the
deadline is designed for prompt restitution for the victim and not to provide
certainty to defendants as to the amount of restitution.116
Fourth, the Court turned its attention to the harm that would be caused to
third parties who are not responsible for missing the deadline.117 Here, the
victim of the crime would be deprived of receiving restitution not because he
failed to meet the deadline, but because the court failed to meet the
deadline.118 The threat of such harm that would be imposed by an alternative
interpretation of the statute strongly supports the idea that Congress did not
intend forfeiture to be the penalty for missing the deadline.119
Fifth, the Court noted that it has considered the same issue with similar
statutes and has refused to view the lapsing of the deadline as operating as a
bar to action by the court.120 In Montalvo-Murillo, the Court ruled that when
a judicial officer missed a deadline imposed by the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
which mandated that a hearing be held “immediately upon the person’s first
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664A(a)(1), (f)(1)(A)).
Id. at 2540.
Id. at 2539-40 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(1), (d)(5)).
Id. at 2540.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (2000).
Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2540.
Id.
See id.
Id. (citing Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 262 (1986)).
Id. (citing United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990)).
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appearance before the judicial officer,” the judicial officer was not required to
release the person.121 Allowing the lapsed deadline to require the release of
the detainee would controvert the aim of the Bail Reform Act—namely,
preventing the release of dangerous detainees and avoiding the likely
commission of crimes.122
In the case of the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline, denying the restitution
order based on missing the deadline would defeat the Act’s purpose.123 Also,
such a remedy would be disproportionate to any harm inflicted upon the
defendant through delay, especially in light of the fact the defendant in this
case knew before the ninety-day deadline lapsed that restitution would be
ordered.124
Sixth, a defendant possesses the ability to mitigate harm caused by a
missed deadline, especially if the defendant “obtains the relevant information
regarding the restitution amount before the 90-day deadline expires.”125
Additionally, a defendant worried about missing the deadline may simply
point out to the court the potential error, prompting the court to set a timely
hearing.126 In the event the court fails to meet the statutory deadline imposed,
the defendant may resort to seeking mandamus.127
Because the six considerations just discussed led the Court to determine
that the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline is a “speed-seeking” deadline, the
Court held that “[t]he fact that a sentencing court misses the statute’s 90-day
deadline, even through its own fault or that of the government, does not
deprive the court of the power to order restitution.”128
V. Analysis of the Decision
A. The Court Eviscerated the Plain Meaning of the MVRA and Legislated
from the Bench
The central issue presented in Dolan implicates the bigger issue of
statutory interpretation. The Court looked not only to the language of the
statute, but also to its legislative purpose, citing the MVRA’s legislative
history.129 Detractors of the Court’s opinion, however, will focus on the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
Id. at 2541 (citing Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 720).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2539.
See id. at 2540 (acknowledging the Court’s use of legislative history to interpret the
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words alone of the statutory text, believing that the text is clear enough on its
face to render a decision.130 While resolution of this difference depends on
whether one subscribes to the textualist or traditional theory of statutory
interpretation, the Court’s decision is about much more than how it interprets
the statute; it is about whether or not it ultimately legislated from the bench.
The Supreme Court has previously stated that “[g]iven a straightforward
statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.”131
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, the reason a court should be bound by
the text of the statute rather than the legislative purpose of the statute is
because “[j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’
intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, [judges] are not free to
replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”132 Justice Scalia’s view of
statutory interpretation sits squarely within the bedrock constitutional notion
of separation of powers which serves to protect the integrity and
independence of the different branches of government.133 Indeed, even prior
to the rise of Justice Scalia as the champion of the textualist school of
thought, the Supreme Court wisely stated:
The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the
intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has
used. He is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rule
of grammar. . . . No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for
contingencies, which it may seem wise to have specifically
provided for, justify any judicial addition to the language of the
statute.134
In this case, the majority looked to the purpose of the Act—providing full
restitution to crime victims—and to the legislative history of the deadline
provision, which they determined to have a speed-seeking intent primarily for
the benefit of the victim and only secondarily for the benefit of the
defendant.135 To arrive at that conclusion, the Court used not only the
legislative history of the MVRA, but also one of its enacted provisions.136

purpose of ninety-day time limit).
130. See id. at 2546 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “the Court runs through a
series of irrelevancies that cannot trump the clear statutory text”).
131. United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).
132. INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
133. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 239 (2009).
134. United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897) (emphasis added).
135. See Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2539-40.
136. See id. at 2540.
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The Court interpreted § 3664(d)(5), which provides, “If the victim
subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall have 60 days after
discovery of those losses in which to petition the court for an amended
restitution order,” to mean that Congress intended for restitution to be ordered
after the ninety-day deadline has lapsed.137 The Court then rhetorically asked
the dissenters how their interpretation of the MVRA—that missing the
ninety-day deadline strips a court of the authority to order restitution—would
make any sense in light of the majority’s reading of the statute.138
The answer is that Congress not only absolutely intended victims to recoup
full and accurately calculated restitution but also foresaw the need for the
ability of a court to amend restitution past the ninety-day deadline. Congress
anticipated that inaccuracies would occur when deciding the amount of
restitution to be ordered. As such, Congress explicitly included in the
MVRA a provision that gives a court the power to change the amount of a
restitution order; however, that provision requires that the court make an
initial restitution order that may be amended.139 By allowing a court to order
restitution, for the first time, after the ninety-day deadline has lapsed, the
Court has essentially deleted a provision from the MVRA and replaced it
with its own judicially created provision, ignoring the plain meaning of the
statute as explicitly embodied in § 3664(d)(5), and thereby legislating from
the bench.
The majority took legislative intent as carte blanche to effectuate the
overarching goal of the MVRA, even in the face of a contrary plain reading
of the statute that requires a timely restitution order. The Supreme Court has
already spoken on the issue of allowing legislative intent to run awry in
statutory interpretation: “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. . . . it
frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume
that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” 140
In addition to ignoring the plain language of the statute, the majority’s
decision may inevitably frustrate the purpose of the deadline provision in the
MVRA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after
review of the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline provision, determined that “the
purpose behind the statutory ninety-day limit on the determination of victims’
losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing proceedings or
to establish finality; rather, it is to protect crime victims from the willful

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 2544.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (2000).
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam).
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dissipation of defendants’ assets.”141 By allowing a court to miss the ninetyday deadline for ordering restitution with impunity, the Court opens the door
for victims to lose their ability to collect restitution by giving defendants a
larger window of time to dispose of their assets.
B. The Court Ignored the Rule of Lenity and Violated the Separation of
Powers
The Court chose not to follow the plain language of the statute in its
interpretation of the MVRA, thus, it willingly waded into the uncertain
waters of statutory construction and interpretation. By doing so, the Court
ignored default rules of interpretation, thereby violating the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. One default rule for interpreting
ambiguous criminal statutes is the rule of lenity: “ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”142 Lenity
provides that ambiguous criminal statutes are to be interpreted against the
government. The rule of lenity, however, is not automatically invoked
anytime ambiguity exists; it is invoked only when a “grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act”143 remains after
“seiz[ing] everything from which aid can be derived”144 and when “such an
interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.”145 The Court in Dolan quickly dismissed Dolan’s argument for
the application of the rule of lenity and argued that the rule has not been
applied “to a statutory time provision in the criminal context” and that the
ambiguity was not sufficient to warrant the use of the rule in this context.146
Undoubtedly, the Court did not believe that there was any “grievous”
ambiguity warranting the rule of lenity’s use.147 Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine what type of ambiguity in a deadline provision is grievous enough to
warrant the rule of lenity’s traditional invocation. The rule has traditionally
been invoked to ensure that defendants receive proper notice concerning what
acts are prohibited, with a goal of avoiding any “grievous” due process issues
while also reinforcing the notion that the judiciary does not share the same
legislative powers as the legislature.148 At least one scholar, however, has
141. United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2004).
142. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (quoting Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
143. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974).
144. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
145. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958).
146. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (2010).
147. See id.
148. Spiro, supra note 3, at 107.
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argued that while notice does play a role in statutory interpretation, “actual
notice seems less central than does separation of powers.”149 From the
perspective of separation of powers, there may be no more grievous of an
ambiguity than one that results in one branch of government encroaching
upon the power of another branch, such as the Supreme Court rewriting
legislation. Yet this is what the Court in Dolan was forced to do by
abandoning the straightforward command of the MVRA’s text. The Court
forced itself to disregard the express requirement of issuing an initial
restitution order prior to the deadline and, instead, imposed an optional
deadline.
As a statutory canon that favors the politically powerless, the application
of the rule of lenity serves the purpose of effectuating clarity in statutes and
“elicit[ing] legislative reactions that more precisely indicate which
preferences are enactable.”150 It seems counterintuitive, as a bare matter of
legislative intent, for a court to interpret any criminal statute in favor of
criminal defendants since most legislatures tend to draft such statutes with the
intent of punishing criminals.151 However, by interpreting criminal statutes
narrowly, problems are more likely to be addressed by legislative
amendments that clarify the statute’s meaning in light of an unfavorable
interpretation by a court, thereby maintaining the expected separation of
powers between the judicial and legislative branches.152
The Court in Dolan was also concerned that the rule of lenity previously
had not been applied to a criminal statute’s time provision.153 Yet, such an
application of the rule of lenity is not a novel idea. In United States v.
Jolivette, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced the
exact issue presented in Dolan, namely, whether the lapsed ninety-day
deadline in the MVRA strips a court of authority to order restitution.154 The
Sixth Circuit did not apply the rule of lenity because it found the command of
Congress present in the plain meaning of the statute, prohibiting a court from
ordering restitution past the deadline.155 It stated, however, that had the intent
of Congress not been apparent in a plain reading of the statute, the court
149. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 64
(1998).
150. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 168 (2008) (emphasis added).
151. Id. (stating “[m]ost legislative polities are hostile to criminal defendants”).
152. Id. at 169.
153. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (2010).
154. See generally 257 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2001).
155. Id. at 584.
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would have “appl[ied] the well-settled rule requiring that any ambiguity in
criminal statutes be resolved against the government and in favor of the
criminal defendant.”156
Dolan presented the first opportunity for the Court to apply the rule of
lenity to a deadline provision of a criminal statute.157 Absent a plain textual
meaning that clarified that a sentencing court must order restitution within a
specified time period, the Court faced an ambiguity as to the consequences of
a lapsed deadline. Although the Court sought to clarify the legislative intent
of Congress, ambiguity remains as to why Congress would include a
mandatory deadline and an additional provision providing for amending a
restitution order, if it simply intended for a court to be able to violate the
deadline with impunity. Moreover, although the Court recognized that the
rule of lenity has never been applied by the Supreme Court to a timing
provision, an ambiguity which causes the grievous mistake of not
maintaining the separation of powers between the Court and Congress should
be enough to invoke the rule of lenity in a deadline case of this nature.
C. Montalvo-Murillo: A False Parallel
One of the weakest aspects of the majority’s opinion in Dolan is its
reference to, and reliance upon, United States v. Montalvo-Murillo as a
parallel case.158 This reliance weakens the Dolan opinion not only because of
the Court’s use of an arbitrary category for interpreting a statute, but also
because the circumstances of Montalvo-Murillo do not parallel the
circumstances in Dolan as well as the majority would like. Specifically, the
result in Dolan effects a stated legislative goal but does not effectuate any
common law goal of punishment in criminal law, while the result in
Montalvo-Murillo does both.
Montalvo-Murillo addressed the appropriate remedy for missing the
hearing deadline provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1994.159 That provision
states that a detention hearing “shall be held immediately upon the person’s
first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney
for the Government, seeks a continuance.”160 The Court explicitly held that
156. Id. (dicta) (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n.17 (1994)).
157. See Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2544 (noting that no example of the rule of lenity’s
application to a time provision of a criminal statute has been provided).
158. See id. at 2538 (referencing Montalvo-Murillo as an example of a time-related
directive); see also id. at 2540-41 (comparing the Bail Reform Act time provision with that
of the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act’s deadline provision).
159. 495 U.S. 711, 713 (1990).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).
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“a failure to comply with the first appearance requirement does not defeat the
Government’s authority to seek detention of the person charged.”161
Additionally, the Court emphasized that its ruling was consistent with its
interpretation of the purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 “as an
appropriate regulatory device to assure the safety of persons in the
community and to protect against the risk of flight.”162
In Dolan, the Court explicitly paralleled its reasoning for effectuating the
purpose of the MVRA to that of Montalvo-Murillo, saying, “As in MontalvoMurillo, [to hold otherwise] would defeat the basic purpose of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act.”163 The majority’s ruling in Dolan, however,
blatantly parallels the two cases without a close examination of the
circumstances in each case and ignores a key difference between them.
The key difference between the decisions in Montalvo-Murillo and Dolan
is that the result in Montalvo-Murillo furthers a well-established goal of
criminal law writ large, which is to restrain dangerous individuals from
harming society,164 while the result in Dolan simply furthers the MVRA’s
narrower legislative goal of providing full restitution to victims of certain
already-proscribed crimes.165 Without doubt, the legislative intent is
considered by many to be an important factor in interpreting the meaning of a
statute,166 but the Supreme Court has also stated that this factor should not be
pursued at all costs.167
From the textualist perspective, the decision in Montalvo-Murillo runs
counter to a plain reading of the text of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 which
commands that a detention hearing be held at the first appearance before a
judicial officer.168 The Montalvo-Murillo decision, however, at least
reinforces the commonly recognized goal and theory of punishment in
criminal law: “emphasis is more on the prevention of the undesirable than on
the encouragement of the desirable.”169 By allowing the defendant’s release
in the face of a lapsed deadline, the Court would have made a ruling that ran
counter to the very foundation of criminal law, which is to protect citizens
161. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 717.
162. Id. at 719-20.
163. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2541.
164. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(2) (5th ed. 2010).
165. The purpose of this argument is not to belittle or relegate the role of restitution in the
criminal context, but rather to illustrate the difference in circumstances that, in my opinion,
should have been taken into account when deciding Dolan.
166. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 61 (2001).
167. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).
169. LAFAVE, supra note 164, § 1.5.
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from the unscrupulous. Specifically, such a ruling would have failed to
effectuate the criminal law goal of “restraint.”170 Indeed, states (the
traditional arbiters of criminal law) have announced a similar rationale to
statutory interpretation, with one court stating:
It is within the province of the court, and, indeed, it is its duty, to
render such an interpretation of the laws as will best subserve the
ends of justice and the protection of the public, in so far as this
may be done in accordance with well-established rules of
construction.171
The decision announced in Dolan, however, does not share the same
foundational and factual support that existed in Montalvo-Murillo. A
legitimate parallel cannot be made. Unlike Montalvo-Murillo, the decision in
Dolan furthers a legislative goal that exists separate from the traditional
goals underpinning the foundation and existence of criminal law. By
allowing the deadline to lapse without consequences, the Court not only
strayed from a plain reading of the language in the MVRA requiring a timely
restitution order—mandatory language which Congress chose to use—but the
majority’s decision also failed to effectuate any common law goal of
punishment central to criminal law.
In Dolan, Brian Dolan suffered the consequences of his actions. He was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment and had already been released from
prison when the district court ordered restitution on April 24, 2008.172 Thus,
the district court imposed its restitution order upon Dolan after he had served
his prison sentence.173 Unlike the Court in Montalvo-Murillo, the Court in
Dolan lacked any broader goals of criminal law to justify its decision to allow
legislative intent to override the plain meaning of the MVRA. Unlike
Montalvo-Murillo, society was neither in danger nor in need of protection
from Brian Dolan. Unlike Montalvo-Murillo, ignoring the plain meaning of
the statute did not serve a broader purpose of criminal law.
VI. Conclusion
Some of the leading scholars on statutory interpretation summed up the
state of affairs pessimistically, but accurately, stating, “The hard truth of the
matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. § 1.5(a)(2).
Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Gosnell, 90 S.E. 264, 267 (S.C. 1916).
Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2546 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id.
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consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”174 Indeed, one current
member of the Supreme Court has stated, “Surely this is a sad commentary:
We American judges have no intelligible theory of what we do most.”175
Such state of affairs has led at least one scholar to argue that courts should
give a stare decisis effect to a court’s interpretation methodology to provide
continuity and predictability within a court system.176 Yet, lacking
consistency is only one effect of failing to have a uniform method of statutory
interpretation. The Court’s decision in Dolan illustrates a much graver effect
of allowing courts to stray too far from the written words in a statute—
encroachment upon legislative powers by the judiciary.
In Dolan, the Court chose to ignore the plain meaning of the statute’s
language and instead embarked on a journey through the legislative history of
the MVRA and its ninety-day restitution order deadline in order to arrive at a
decision that essentially rewrites the language of the MVRA itself. By doing
so, the Court in Dolan veered off course from its role as an interpreter of the
law and wandered into legislative territory by essentially deleting provisions
that Congress explicitly wrote into the MVRA. When the Court chose to
ignore the plain meaning of the MVRA’s language, it was forced to enter into
a mental exercise of divining the non-enacted intent of Congress. Along the
way, the Court ignored default rules for statutory construction and ignored
key differences in cases that were essential to its reasoning. By ignoring the
plain language of the MVRA and a statutory default rule like the rule of
lenity, the Court missed the opportunity to avoid blurring the separation of
powers and legislated from the bench.
Alexander J. Sisemore

174. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
175. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
14 (1997).
176. See Foster, supra note 2, at 1870.
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